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the attorney, he could then move under CPLR 308(4) for an
order directing service on the attorney as agent for the defendant,
since the court has said that there is "contact" between the attorney
and the defendant; (2) if the plaintiff secures an examination of
the attorney, however, and obtains the defendant's address, then
he would have to attempt service under 308(1) and (3) before
he could move for an order under 308(4); (3) if service under
308(1) and (3) were to be impracticable, however, he could then
move to serve the attorney as defendant's agent under 308(4).
CPLR 308(4):

Conflict over requirements of due process.

Although substituted service need not give actual notice to
the defendant, it must be reasonably calculated to apprise him of
the pendency of the action and afford him the opportunity to be
heard. 6 There appears to be a conflict between the first and second
departments concerning substituted service under CPLR 308 and
the constitutional requirements of due process.
The second department, in Dobkin v. Chapman,7 affirmed a
court-devised method of service under CPLR 308(4).
There,
the court held that due process was satisfied by service which
amounted to the mailing of the summons to an address supplied
by the defendant at the time of an automobile accident, even though
the plaintiff knew that the defendant no longer resided there.
The approach taken by the first department, however, was more
restrictive. In Polansky v. Paugh,8 the court unanimously held
that where a plaintiff knew that the defendant did not reside at
the stated address, due process was not satisfied since there was
no reasonable probability that the defendant would receive notice
of the pending action. Although Polansky was decided under
CPLR 308(3), and Dobkin under 308(4), it should be noted
that the same due process considerations apply to each.
Brown v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.,19 a recent supreme court case
in the second department, involved the validity of substituted service

under CPLR 308(3). There, an automobile accident occurred
in New York between plaintiff, a New York resident, and a nondomiciliary defendant. Defendant gave plaintiff a Florida address
at which the plaintiff attempted service under Section 253 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, this attempt failed since
the registered letter sent to the defendant in Florida was returned
marked "moved-left no address."
Thereafter, plaintiff had a
Florida sheriff attempt personal service on the defendant at the
Florida address. When this also failed, the sheriff mailed a
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copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at this
address and affixed a copy to the door of the same premises. The
court held that such service satisfied due process requirements.
In so doing, it attempted to distinguish Polansky by showing that
in that case an affidavit was produced stating that the defendant
had left the address at which service was made "some time ago."
However, in the instant case, only an unsigned post office notation
stating that the defendant had moved was introduced into evidence.
The court relied on Dobkin for the proposition that plaintiff's
knowledge that the defendant no longer resides at the last known
address where service is made does not vitiate such service. The fact
that Dobkin arose under 308(4), while Brown arose under 308(3),
was of no moment, since the Brown court felt that if the service
in Dobkin satisfied due process, "then it would appear that service
pursuant to CPLR 308'20 (subd. [3]) would also satisfy the requirements of due process.
Remaining, however, is the apparent conflict between the first
and second departments on the question of whether substituted
service is valid when directed at an address at which plaintiff knows
the defendant does not reside. Only the Court of Appeals and,
possibly, the United States Supreme Court can resolve this problem.
It is submitted that the first department's holding in Polansky
is more consistent with traditional concepts of due process. It is
difficult to see how service directed at an address known to be
incorrect can be reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of
the pendency of a suit.2 '
ARTICLE

22 -STAY,

MOTIONS, ORDERS AND MANDATES

CPLR 2219(a): Validity of order unaffected by failure of court
to decide motion within time limitation.
According to CPLR 2219(a), an order determining a motion
relating to a provisional remedy shall be made within twenty days,
and an order determining any other motion shall be made within
sixty days, after such motion is submitted for decision. A recent
20 Id. at 414, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
2"It should also be noted that the instant decision tends to extend the

limits of CPLR 303(3) further than the legislature intended. The statute
clearly states that when service under 308(1) cannot be made with due
diligence, then service is to be made "by mailing the summons to the person
to be served at his last known residence and either affixing the Summons to
the door of his place of business, dwelling house or itsual place of abode... :'
(Emphasis added.) The language of the statute appears to indicate that the
legislature did not intend that the "nailing" and mailing be both made at
the defendant's last known residence, as in the instant case. See McK-mmf's
CPLR, supp. commentary 133 (1965).

